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Individual variation in human navigation

Nora S. Newcombe
The cognitive map view of navigation posits that humans and other species represent space in a format that encodes the distances and directions among locations in relation to external reference frames such as boundaries and landmarks. Such an allocentric representation is combined with egocentric representations that track a navigator's position over movement. Jointly, these systems enable the fl exible planning of routes, including shortcuts, detours, and paths between two locations not formerly travelled. Tolman's (1948) work on the sunburst maze initiated this tradition. In the sunburst maze, rats who had followed a circuitous route to fi nd a reward, as shown at the left of Figure 1 , could take a shortcut to the goal when their route was blocked and other routes were offered, as shown at the right of Figure 1 . That is, to use one set of terms, they were place learners as well as response learners, or to use another set of terms, they formed survey representations as well as route representations.
Primer
Tolman's experiment challenged the view that stimulus-response associations could explain all animal behaviour, and thus was an early harbinger of the cognitive revolution. The cognitive map idea has continued to be prominent in neuroscience research, associated with the Nobelworthy discovery of neurons that code location (place cells and grid cells), as well as head direction cells, border cells and boundary cells. Recent neuroimaging work suggests that, as regards spatial cognition, the human brain is substantially similar to the rodent brain.
But do we (and other species) really form 'cognitive maps'? There are many criticisms of the idea, based on fi ndings of various kinds of imprecision and irrationality. For example, human participants seem to remain unaware of distortions in a virtual environment that includes wormholes that transport them to a different section of a maze. They do not become lost or disoriented, and in fact are perfectly happy to take the wormhole 'shortcut' (Warren et al., 2017) . If the gaps between wormholes are not represented, the cognitive map does not seem very Euclidean. The alternative is that human spatial representations may be like a labeled graph -a mathematical structure in which The rats initially traverse a route with several turns to get to a reward and were later offered a sunburst array of routes. They mostly chose the route that would take them directly to the reward, or a route not too far off. There are several research paradigms that have been designed to examine individual variation in navigational abilities and preferences. Each paradigm assesses one of three key features of cognitive maps: fi nding shortcuts (the behaviour that Tolman studied in the sunburst maze); using distal landmarks to anchor encoding of a set of locations in an environmental frame; and integrating separatelylearned routes to form a survey map. All of the paradigms use virtual reality. Although there have been concerns about virtual reality as a model of the real world, virtual reality is necessary to surmount the practical challenge of the real-world environment, such as cancellations due to bad weather, the necessity to transport participants to unfamiliar areas, and the impossibility of testing diverse geographic and cultural populations in a standard environment. Logistical factors in the real world limit sample size, making it diffi cult to gather large enough samples to have the statistical power to probe individual differences. Tolman's (1948) experiment required rats to fi nd a shortcut. Ever since, fi nding shortcuts (and shortcuts' complement, detours) has been central to the behavioural defi nition of what we mean by a cognitive map. Marchette et al. (2011) devised a task called the dualsolution paradigm to tap navigation strategy and preferences in a virtual maze -whether individuals prefer a place-based or response-based approach to navigation. Navigators must learn to locate a set of objects in a maze, but can fi nd them using either a learned familiar route or a R1006 Current Biology 28, R952-R1008, September 10, 2018 novel shortcut. This task was inspired by neural data suggesting that a hippocampal system underlies place learning, whereas a striatal system underlies response learning, as well as by data showing that people can self-report on whether they prefer to form an overall representation of an area or to follow familiar routes. Figure 2 shows the overhead plan of the maze and a screen shot of what participants see as they navigate the maze. The dual-solution paradigm allows investigators to characterize participants using a 'solution index' that captures the number of shortcuts that participants take relative to their total number of classifi able solutions, excluding trials on which participants simply wander in the maze rather than either seeking a shortcut or fi nding a familiar route. Notably, this index has a continuous distribution. That is, although some people always follow a familiar path and other people always seek a shortcut, many people use a mixture of the two strategies. As predicted, strategies are linked to brain activation during both encoding and during the solution period: seeking shortcuts is identifi ed with relatively greater hippocampal activation and following familiar routes with greater striatal activation. Furthermore, behavior and brain activation are both correlated with self-reports, indicating self-awareness of strategies. In sum, people vary considerably in their strategies and preferences for constructing and using a cognitive map of the maze, and they vary along a continuum rather than forming dichotomous groups.
Finding shortcuts
Using distal landmarks
The sunburst maze only had one route, so fi nding a shortcut required either encoding the spatial location of the goal box with respect to the distal landmarks in the room or computing the angles of the turns in the route and the distances of each leg of the route, and from those angles and distances, calculating the angle of departure in the sunburst. Nowadays, we distinguish those two modes of learning. The classic method of assessing use of distal landmarks is the water maze. Little work has been done on measuring individual differences using the water maze, however; instead, most attention has focused on gender differences. Differences between males and females are certainly one aspect of individual differences, although hardly exhaustive of such differences, as the distributions of male and female performance are almost always substantially overlapping.
Work using the water maze with rodents as well as humans has converged on the conclusion that males use distal landmarks more effectively than females. A recent illustrative study was done by Padilla et al. (2017) . An overhead view of the environments used in this study is shown at the left of Figure 3 , with screen shots of the participants' views at the right. People saw scenes with both distal and proximal landmarks. Each was rendered at a large or a small scale. Males made fewer errors than females in most conditions, especially at the larger scale.
One implication of this pattern of fi ndings is that the kind of encoding most likely to support the formation of map-like spatial representations varies with whatever factors are indexed by gender, including various biological, cognitive, experiential and motivational factors. Males are more likely to form survey representations and females are more likely to form route representations. The other implication of the data is that it would Current Biology 28, R952-R1008, September 10, 2018 R1007 be erroneous to claim either that humans normatively form survey representations, or that they do not. Future research is needed to link individual differences in performance on the water maze to aspects of cognition, personality, occupational pressures, or brain activation during encoding and search.
Integrating route maps to form survey maps A third behaviour implicit in the cognitive map metaphor is that individual routes could be related to each other to form an overall spatial representation, perhaps using a common distal framework. The local areas or routes might still be maintained and their relation coded in a hierarchical fashion. Ishikawa and Montello (2006) devised a route integration paradigm to assess the extent to which separately-learned areas can be related to each other. Participants experienced two separated routes and a connecting route. There were striking individual differences: some people related the two routes effectively, immediately, and seemingly easily; some people learned to relate the routes over time; but others never integrated the routesthey never formed a cognitive map.
To evaluate larger samples, we devised a virtual learning environment called Silcton. Figure 4 shows the overhead map and a screen shot of what participants see in this virtual environment. Individual differences emerged for both within-and between-route judgments, as well as for a model-building measure. A cluster analysis based on betweenand within-route pointing scores suggested the existence of three groups. One group, Integrators, performed well on both within-and between-route judgments. A second group, Non-integrators, performed well on within-route judgments, but relatively poorly on between-route judgments. A third group, Imprecise Navigators, performed relatively poorly (although above chance) on both types of pointing judgment (Weisberg and Newcombe, 2016) .
What accounts for the different behavior of these three groups? In terms of emotion and personality, Imprecise Navigators scored higher on a spatial anxiety self-report measure, which may either refl ect accurate self-assessment -they also scored lower on the Santa Barbara Sense of Direction (SBSOD) scale -or suggest that anxiety is preventing them from trying new routes. Additionally, Integrators may be good navigators because they are adventurous, and relish the challenge of learning a new environment. Silcton performance has not been related directly to personality factors, but SBSOD scores are related to Openness on the Big 5 personality test, which is a measure of curiosity, ingenuity and adventurousness, and to Extraversion, which measures energy, enthusiasm and approach behavior (Condon et al., 2015) .
In terms of cognitive capacities, we can examine both domain-general and domain-specifi c abilities. A domaingeneral resource is working memory. We have found that Integrators and Non-Integrators both outperform Imprecise Navigators on verbal and spatial-symmetry working memory measures, while Integrators excel especially on spatial-relational working memory. In terms of domain-specifi c cognitive capacities, namely measures of spatial ability, variations in Silcton performance correlate with mental rotation and with perspective-taking. These two spatial skills may have a very different causal status, however. Perspective taking is more closely related to navigation, conceptually, behaviorally and neurally. Conceptually, mental rotation applies to graspable objects and small-scale displays that can be turned with the hands, whereas perspective taking applies to various views of larger arrays and environmental scenes that are typically obtained when people walk around or through their environment. Empirically, perspective-taking skills are often the best predictor of individual differences in real-world spatial learning and At top, screen shots of Silcton (Weisberg and Newcombe, 2016) . At bottom, a map of Silcton. Weisberg and Newcombe (2016) reprinted with permission by APA.
R1008 Current Biology 28, R952-R1008, September 10, 2018 account well for age-related variance in Silcton (Nazareth et al., 2018) . Furthermore, walking around displays that can only be viewed piecemeal facilitates fl exible encoding of overall spatial relationships more than does turning such an array with the hands. Neurally, perspective taking engages the navigational system while mental rotation engages systems involved with judging magnitude and manipulating objects (Lambrey et al., 2011) .
So, are there cognitive maps?
There have been many back-andforth exchanges in the cognitive map debate. For example, Newcombe et al. (1999) showed that asymmetries in spatial judgment in which people judge the distance from A to B as different from the distance from B to A can be well explained by a category adjustment model, in which underlying representations are accurate but uncertain, and in which Bayesian combination processes lead to predictable and adaptive biases. The wormhole experiment can also be criticized, on the basis of recent neuroimaging work showing that the hippocampus has similar representations of locations that are either close together in space or close together as experienced in time (Deuker et al., 2016) . If the hippocampus normally builds timedependent representations of space, what wormholes do is to trick an evolved system built for the natural world by forcing it to try to cope with an environment possible only in virtual reality.
A way forward in the "cognitive maps -yes or no?" debate is, however, possible. We need to begin with the issue of defi nition. If we postulate that spatial relations in large-scale space exhibit a hierarchical representation, in which local areas, or routes, are represented in detail, but the relations among them are represented more coarsely, the representations may indeed be less veridical than the map metaphor suggests. In this way of thinking, the cognitive map debate boils down to how precise representations need to be to be map-like, or conversely, how imprecise can they be before the map metaphor begins to seem unjustifi ed?
Once the issue is formulated as one of degree, however, rather than as a difference in kind, learning and individual differences become central issues. That is, spatial representations may initially be coarse, categorical, fragmented or error prone, and become refi ned in the course of environmental experience. The extent of the refi nement will vary with effort, capacity, strategies, spatial range and so forth. Viewed in this way, the issue of cognitive maps becomes essentially a question about learning and variations in learning.
Evolution requires variation
Every biological species has normative characteristics. For example, a species of fi nch on the Galapagos has a distinctive beak shape, the central tendency of members of its species. But an individual fi nch has a beak shape and size that is also distinctive -larger or smaller, stronger or weaker than the average. Individual variation is vital to evolution. Finches with certain beak shapes will survive and breed more successfully than others in certain ecological conditions, and normative beak shape can change within several generations in response to environmental pressures.
Although behavioural and psychological characteristics of the human species are no exception to this rule of norm-and-variation, cognitive psychology has tended to focus on normative analysis, regarding individual variation primarily as error variance, and leaving to psychometricians the task of characterizing individual cognitive variation. The result has been a gulf that has been frequently decried, but that researchers have only recently attempted to bridge. Diverse domains are beginning to benefi t from integrating the study of variation with the study of central tendencies. Navigation research is no exception.
Conclusion
There is good reason to suspect that there are marked individual differences in navigation and spatial functioning. Studying this matter requires shareable virtual reality paradigms and the accumulation of much larger and more diverse data sets than has been typical in the existing literature. Doing so will have valuable theoretical and practical benefi ts. But methodological challenges must be tackled fi rst. For example, there is a pressing need to compare paradigms with each other. We already know that Silcton and the dual-solution paradigm have complex relations to each other, but we know nothing about the relation of either to the water maze, or to other paradigms that have hitherto only been studied in terms of normative functioning, such as the wormhole paradigm. In addition, we know little about malleability in spatial learning, even though the existence of books on navigation suggest that these skills are learnable. Once we develop stable, shareable, reliable and valid techniques, we can expect rapid progress.
